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The	Brexit	vote	has	only	deepened	the	political	and
social	divisions	within	British	society
The	UK	is	now	one	of	the	most	unequal	societies	in	Europe.	The	country’s	acute	territorial	differences
are	only	likely	to	multiply	in	the	coming	years.	The	polarisation	between	the	political	right	and	left	is
staggering.	The	society	is	also	now	divided	by	generations.	In	light	of	the	above,	Christopher	Lord
(ARENA)	argues	that	Brexit	is	both	a	product	of	the	breakdown	in	the	British	social	and	political
system	and	a	likely	source	of	further	crises	within	it.	
It	is	a	well-known	problem	of	political	systems	that	majorities	may	be	arbitrary,	unstable	and
indeterminate.	Any	one	possible	majority	can	defeat	other	possible	majorities	with	the	result	that
decisions	can	be	arbitrarily	manipulated	by	those	who	get	to	decide	which	options	are	considered	in	which	order.
Brexit	Britain	faces	a	particularly	dangerous	version	of	that	problem.	Not	only	is	the	UK	deeply	divided	on	all
alternatives	to	EU	membership.	There	is	no	stable	majority	within	British	politics	for	any	one	approach	to	Brexit.	And
yet,	whoever	is	in	HM	Government,	and	however	weak	that	Government	is,	it	will	still	have	significant	powers	to
select	arbitrarily	between	conflicting	approaches	to	Brexit	just	through	decisions	of	timing	and	procedure.	All	that
within	a	political	system	that	is	unusually	exposed	to	dangers	of	majority	or	even	plurality	domination.
Not	only	is	the	UK	deeply	divided	on	all	alternatives	to	EU	membership.	There	is	no
stable	majority	within	British	politics	for	any	one	approach	to	Brexit.
Around	the	time	the	UK	first	entered	the	European	Communities,	many	political	scientists	debated	why	the	UK
political	system	was	so	widely	accepted	when	it	usually	allowed	just	one	party	–	often	with	much	less	than	50%	of
the	vote	–	to	exercise	power	on	its	own	for	up	to	5	years.	Amongst	answers	were	the	following:
First,	the	UK	was	an	unusually	homogenous	society.
Second,	British	parties	competed	for	the	centre	with	the	result	that	even	those	who	voted	for	losing	parties
could	often	expect	similar	policies	from	the	winning	party	of	government	to	those	their	own	preferred	party
would	have	enacted.
Third,	although	a	state	of	four	nations,	territorial	cleavages	within	the	UK	were	(with	the	partial	exception	of
Northern	Ireland)	largely	subsumed	into	a	single	left-right	dimension	of	political	competition.
Fourth,	that	single	left-right	dimension	was	as	weak	as	it	was	unifying	–	left-right	dominated	in	the	absence	of
much	else	to	argue	about.
By	enjoying	a	simple	one-dimensional	structure	of	political	competition	without	polarisation	and	without	smothering
other	forms	of	political	choice,	the	UK	avoided	the	dangers	a	more	multi-dimensional	form	of	political	competition
might	have	posed	for	a	political	system	that	allows	governing	majorities	to	exercise	so	much	power	on	their	own.
Where	choice	is	multi-dimensional,	yet	the	system	majoritarian,	mere	pluralities	cannot	just	govern	to	the	exclusion	of
others.	Those	are	also	the	conditions	where	choice	does	not	depend	on	an	invisible	hand	of	political	competition	for
the	people’s	vote	to	the	exclusion	of	the	all	too	visible	hand	of	a	government	that	is	itself	able	to	select	between
competing	and	contrasting	pluralities	that	have	no	more	title	than	one	another	to	be	considered	the	‘will	of	the
people’.
All	the	foregoing	conditions	for	the	stability	of	the	British	political	system	were	already	eroding	before	Brexit.	Brexit	is
both	a	product	of	the	breakdown	in	the	British	political	system	and	a	likely	source	of	further	crisis	within	it.	Far	from
being	homogenous	enough	to	be	inoculated	against	all	dangers	of	plurality	domination	inherent	in	its	political	system,
the	UK	is	now	one	of	the	most	unequal	societies	in	Europe.	Part	of	the	Brexit	vote	can	be	explained	by	that
inequality.	‘Groups	vulnerable	to	poverty’	were	more	likely	to	support	Brexit.
Brexit	is	both	a	product	of	the	breakdown	in	the	British	political	system	and	a	likely
source	of	further	crisis	within	it.
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Second,	newly	acute	territorial	cleavages	within	the	UK	are	likely	to	multiply	the	difficulties	of	Brexit.	Two	of	the	four
nations	of	the	UK	voted	for	Brexit	and	two	against.	Of	the	two	that	voted	for	Brexit,	Scotland	is	itself	divided	on
whether	it	should	remain	in	the	United	Kingdom.	Northern	Ireland	is	only	recovering	from	decades	of	civil	conflict	with
the	help	of	a	peace	process	which	could	itself	by	disrupted	by	Brexit.	Yet,	taking	account	of	the	special
circumstances	of	Northern	Ireland	is	only	likely	to	sharpen	the	contradictions	between	different	forms	of	Brexit.	To
avoid	a	physical	boundary,	the	UK	might	need	to	remain	in	a	customs	union	with	the	EU.	That	would	be	incompatible
with	Brexiters’	hope	that	leaving	the	EU	would	free	up	the	UK	to	negotiate	free	trade	agreements	of	its	own	all
around	the	world.	Moreover,	without	a	physical	boundary	along	its	mainland	frontier	with	the	EU,	the	UK	will	have	to
rely	more	heavily	on	administrative	checks	within	the	UK	itself	to	satisfy	those	who	were	lead	to	believe	in	the	2016
referendum	that	Brexit	would	reduce	immigration	from	the	Union.
Third,	in	place	of	a	one-dimensional	structure	of	political	competition,	the	UK	does	not	just	have	territorial	cleavages.
It	also	has	two	distinct	left-right	cleavages:	one	preoccupied	with	markets,	the	other	with	immigration	and	identity.	All
that	interacts	with	what	is	surely	the	most	intractable	feature	of	Brexit:	namely,	the	difficulty	of	discerning	any	stable
equilibrium	within	British	politics	for	any	one	approach	to	leaving	the	Union.	For	some,	hard	Brexit	means	open
markets.	The	UK	should	leave	the	single	market	and	the	customs	union	to	operate	like	a	giant	Singapore,	with	a
zero-tariff	regime	and	radical	deregulation.	The	UK,	on	those	assumptions,	would	need	to	remain	open	to	whatever
capital,	labour	and	trade	flows	are	required	by	its	complex	supply	chains,	and	by	the	goal	of	keeping	its	economy	at
the	cutting	edge	of	international	competition.	For	others,	though,	hard	Brexit	means	hard	boundaries,	immigration
control,	and	limits	to	the	globalisation	of	markets	and	life	chances.	Yet,	however,	contradictory	the	Brexit	coalition,	it
may	come	together	again	to	oppose	many	of	the	trade-offs	needed	for	a	soft	Brexit.
Fourth,	the	UK	is	now	divided	by	generations.	Opinion	surveys	indicate	no	majority	for	Brexit	in	any	age	group	under
45.	In	one	survey	only	12%	of	the	18–24	age	group	thought	that	Brexit	was	“right.”	65%	thought	it	“wrong.”
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Further	referendums	and	general	elections	may	be	needed	to	decide	the	form	of	Brexit.	Yet	going	back	to	the	people
may	not	produce	an	answer	either.	John	Curtice	identifies	the	problem.
‘Voters	cannot	be	divided	into	those	who	want	a	soft	and	those	who	want	a	hard	Brexit.	Both	approaches
are	supported	by	a	majority	of	voters…On	the	one	hand,	there	is	near	universal	support	for	maintaining
free	trade	between	the	UK	and	the	EU…On	the	other	hand,	about	seven	in	ten	voters	believe	that	the	UK
should	be	able	to	control	immigration	from	the	EU’.
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Once,	however,	voters	are	asked	which	they	would	support	if	a	choice	really	had	to	be	made	between	those	options,
opinion	remains	every	bit	as	divided	as	it	was	in	the	referendum	itself.	As	Curtice	continues,	‘if	people	are	asked
whether	the	UK	should	allow	EU	migrants	to	come	here	if	this	were	the	only	way	UK	firms	could	trade	freely	with	the
EU,	49%	say	that	the	UK	should	allow	free	movement,	51%	that	it	should	not.’	Once,	then,	the	main	trade-offs	are
taken	into	account,	leave	and	remain	still	seem	to	be	two	equal	and	opposite	forces.
So,	the	predicament	is	something	like	this:	only	by	offering	choices	that	explicitly	trade	off	the	two	left-right	cleavages
–	the	identity	cleavage	and	the	open	market	cleavages	–	can	even	English	opinion	decide	what	it	wants	from	Brexit.
Yet,	any	feasible	trade-off	between	the	cleavages	still	seems	likely	to	split	English	opinion	50:50.	And,	beyond
England,	there	may,	in	any	case,	be	few	forms	of	Brexit	that	will	work	for	all	parts	of	the	UK.
Given	such	confusion,	UK	Governments	–	over	what	may	turn	out	to	be	a	long	process	of	Brexit	–	may	be	tempted	to
impose	particular	solutions	through	party	disciplines,	pressure	of	deadlines	and	particular	procedural	framings	of
choice.	There	would,	most	obviously,	be	a	huge	difference	between	two	kinds	of	second	referendum:	one	with	a
choice	between	the	terms	of	any	Brexit	and	not	leaving	at	all;	another	with	a	choice	between	the	terms	and	leaving
without	any	agreement.		But	losers	in	either	case	–	or	in	any	other	procedure	that	decides	the	eventual	form	of	Brexit
–	will	know	that	majorities	might	also	have	existed	for	quite	different	ways	of	leaving	or	even	staying	within	the	Union.
For	younger	voters	forced	to	live	in	a	Brexit	Britain	for	which	they	did	not	to	vote,	it	is	one	thing	to	accept	being
outvoted	in	a	referendum.	It	is	another	to	accept	a	Brexit	that	does	not	follow	unambiguously	from	a	public	vote
without	intervention	of	more	contestable	decisions	of	procedure	and	timing.	The	referendum	was	supposed	to	settle
the	UK’s	relationship	with	the	EU.	Instead,	it	leaves	the	UK	as	a	deeply	divided	society	with	a	political	system	whose
propensities	to	plurality	domination	are	precisely	the	opposite	to	what	is	needed	to	practice	democratic	politics	in	a
society	that	is	not	just	deeply	divided	but	deeply	divided	along	more	than	one	dimension	of	choice.
The	referendum	was	supposed	to	settle	the	UK’s	relationship	with	the	EU.	Instead,	it
leaves	the	UK	as	a	deeply	divided	society	(…)
Note	also	that	it	is	not	just	a	plurality	that	may	be	able	to	impose	substantive	choices	through	procedural	decisions.	A
‘majority	within	a	plurality’	–	a	majority	within	either	the	Conservative	or	Labour	party	–	may	be	able	to	do	that.	Many
in	the	Conservative	Party	may	come	to	see	the	dangers	of	a	‘majority	within	a	plurality’	deciding	the	form	of	Brexit	–
and,	therefore,	the	whole	nature	of	the	economy	and	society	in	which	they	have	to	live	–	if	that	majority	within	a
plurality	ends	up	being	formed,	not	as	they	too	glibly	suppose,	within	the	Conservative	Party,	but,	rather	within	a
Labour	Government.	Farage	Brexit.	Redwood	Brexit.	Davis-negotiated	Brexit.	Starmer	Brexit.	Corbyn	Brexit.	If	a	left-
wing	form	of	Brexit	prevails	in	the	Labour	Party	and	then	a	Labour	Government,	there	may	be	many	Conservatives	–
and	many	other	Brexiters	–	who	might	come	to	understand	the	deep	dangers	and	injustices	of	a	political	system	that,
at	no	one	point,	allowed	all	varieties	of	leaving	and	remaining	to	be	decided	in	relation	to	one	another.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Christopher	Lord	is	Professor	at	ARENA,	The	Centre	for	European	Studies,	The	University	of	Oslo.
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